When the leacher construes cducation as the advancement of knowl edge, the focus is on the present knowledge the student has. The task is to demonstrate to the student any inadequacies in his knowledge and to supply sufficient encouragement so that he wíll seek better knowledge. Thus, the Socratic teacher is not interested in how or where the student learns; he simply accepts prior learning as a pre condition for education-this is where education begins. Logic, not learning theory, directs pedagogical practice.
Thus, teachers can help advance knowledge regardless of the students' heredity and environment, and with little regard for their social and cultural backgrounds. Logic is not subjective, not socially or culturally relative. At a certain leve! of maturation, as Piaget has demonstrated, youngsters are able to perform logical operations and use them in thinking. The Socratic teacher simply helps th em think (1ogical1y) about their own theories and ideas, initiating a concern with their improvement or advancement.
Of course, schools havc other functions: political, social, and economic. In modern times we have come to construe all three o.f these as "socialization." That is, we view the school as the agency which initiates the young into politics, economics, and society. Sodal ization is, of course, as old as man himse1f. What is new is the notion that schools are the main agents-a notion that has led many to conc1ude that education is primarily socialization.
It is obvious that political, economic, and psychological socialization are forms of control and manipulation. When education is construed as socialization, it becomes a process of shaping or moulding the young into predetermined modes of behavior; simply, authoritarianism. No doubt people f ail (or refuse) to see it this way as long as they find existing political, social, and economic arrangements acceptable. But when-as in recent times--there is increased disenchantment with those arrangements, then people begin to complain about the authoritarian· ism in the schools' attempts to socialize the young. The rash of romantic criticism during the late sixties and early seventies against the oppressive na : ture widespread disenchantment with the established social, political, and economic system.
Sincethat time, the cnd of the Vietnam war, the recession, and the massage of the media have pacified the movement to smash or change the system, and things have settled down in the 8chools too-back to business as usual.
Yet socialization is still an authoritarian business. And the trouble with authoritarianism is that it stultifies improvement. The de1iberate attempt to socialize the young prevents the advancement, the improve ment of society. For just as knowledge can advance, so can our social arrangements improve-and in the same way: via criticism. Quite simply, criticism of our social, political, economic arrange ments will be directed toward revealing the sufIering or pain these arrangements produce. Improvement wiU consist in the eliminaiion, orat lcast reduction, of that pain and suffering.
Criticism requires an open society where decisions made by those in authority-government officials, employers, and teachers can be criticized by those adversely affected by them-citizens, employees, and students. Moreover, in an open society such criticisms are taken seriously, and the existing decisions reconstructed in light of those criticisms that remain unrefuted. In an open society people can protect themselves against those in authority.
Admittedly, this conception construes improvement negatively, as the reduction of pain and sufIering, simply because human beings lack knowledge of what a good society is. However, instead of questing vainly für one or another ideal society, people could fücus on what is-on the existing süciety. They could approach it critically. They cüuld seek a better society through discovering what is wrüng with the existing arrangements. The recünstruction ür replacement of old arrangements in the light of such criticism would mean imprüved cünditions. Of course, new arrangements are never perfect, and require a continuing critical approach, and so on ad infinitum.
All this merely points out the possibility of improvement, üf eliminating or reducing victimizatiün. The desire must cüme from uso We must care about the quality of our süciety.
'I1he creatiün of an open society is, in part, an educational task üne for the schools. The young must be prepared to participate in critical dialogue. One way to do this is to present "what is" to the young-descriptions of the existing social, political, economic ar rangements, or what some people say thüse arrangements are; what problems , they were set up to solve; how they operate. Then swdents can critically appraise t:hem, as well as aU proposals for new ür altered arrangements. The teacher's task would be to engage his students in a critical dialogue, criticizing their criticisms, püinting üut what is invalid. In this way, the school would becüme the critical agency orf the society, an impürtant force for improvement. Note that this dües n0' t envisiün the schoül as a panacea. Rather than the "problem solver," the schoül will become the "problem raiser" üf the society. Now schools cannot take on this role unless teachers become more sophisticated in philosophy-especially in logic, both formal and in formal. Yet the creation üf an open, advancing society demands more than skilIs of logic. It rcquires citizens who prize rationality, eschew dogm�tism, foreswear fanaticism, and who possess a developed social consciüusness. The study üf sücial philosophy in the high school can, I think, move many toward these goals.
The study of philosophy can deveIop critical rationality-by which 1 mean a critical approach toward aII that human beings have created:
toward aU theories, all institutions, and aIl sociaI, political, and economic arrangements. CriticaI rationalists hold that man can never create perfect social arrangements, but they insist that man can rationally improve whatever he has created through criticizing it and uncovering its inadequacies. This kind of critical rationality should, 1 think, inform aIl work in the social studies in high sohool.
Next,the study of philosophy can help make would·be reformers less dogmatic by encouraging them to look for improvement through dialogue--through the give and �ake of argumento Such citizens will be less tempted to pursue change through confrontation and imposition of their soIutions on others.
Further, the study of philosophy can reduce the degree orf fanaticism among reformers, encouraging them to regard al! reforms as trials we can criticize, as experiments we can learn from. The study of phiIosophy can engender a disinterested, critical concern with aU answers-aII existing ' and proposed sociaI policies, practices, and procedures.
FinaIIy, 1 think that the study of philos' 0phy can help develop a social consciousness-an awareness that we are responsible for the arrangements in our society. We have created them; it is up to us to renew and improve them. (1) Philosophy could be ofIered as a full or halrf course, either for credit or general interest, and at various grade Ievds; (2) philosophy could be incIuded in the actual content of courses aIready being taught in secondary 5cho ' 0ls (e.g., section in a mathemati cs course, a philosophy of history section in a history course, an aesthetics section in an art course etc.); (3) phil osophy could be applied to clarifying vaIue issues integral to the discipline. There are numerous instances of such value issues occurring iri' high school subjects. Some examples are: the defen5ibility of Trudeau's declaration of the War Measures Act; the soundness of Euclid's proof of the Pythagorean theorem; the re!evance of an experi. men: t involving the observa1:ions of scintil1ations on a luminous surface to a theory about the existence and nature of electrons. 1 wish to argue that the inclusion of phiIosophy in a high schooI curricuIum as indi· cated in item (3) abovr is not onIy desirable but insep arable from Vol. II, No. 2, July/Oct. 1976 
